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ABSTRACT
To fix a software bug, you must first find it. As software grows
in size and complexity, finding bugs is becoming harder. To solve
this problem, measures have been developed to rank lines of code
according to their "suspiciousness" wrt being faulty. Engineers
can then inspect the code in descending order of suspiciousness
until a fault is found. Despite advances, ideal measures — ones
which are at once lightweight, effective, and intuitive — have not
yet been found. We present Doric, a new formal foundation for
statistical fault localisation based on classical probability theory.
To demonstrate Doric’s versatility, we derive cl, a lightweight
measure of the likelihood some code caused an error. cl returns
probabilities, when spectrum-based heuristics (sbh) usually return
difficult to interpret scores. cl handles fundamental fault scenarios
that spectrum-based measures cannot and can also meaningfully
identify causes with certainty. We demonstrate its effectiveness
in, what is to our knowledge, the largest scale experiment in the
fault localisation literature. For Defects4J benchmarks, cl permits
a developer to find a fault after inspecting 6 lines of code 41.1.8%
of the time. Furthermore, cl is more accurate at locating faults
than all known 127 sbh. In particular, on Steimann’s benchmarks
one would expect to find a fault by investigating 5.02 methods, as
opposed to 9.02 with the best performing sbh.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering→ Error handling and recov-
ery;
KEYWORDS
fault localisation, debugging
1 INTRODUCTION
Software fault localisation is the problem of quickly identifying the
parts of the code that caused an error. Accordingly, the develop-
ment of effective and efficient methods for fault localisation has
the potential to greatly reduce costs, wasted programmer time, and
the possibility of catastrophe [1]. In this paper, we focus on meth-
ods of lightweight statistical software fault localisation. In general,
statistical methods use a given fault localisation measure to assign
lines of code a real number, called that line of code’s "suspicious-
ness" degree, as a function some statistics about the program and
test suite. In spectrum-based fault localisation, the engineer then
inspects the code in descending order of suspiciousness until a fault
is found. The driving force behind research in spectrum-based fault
localisation is the search for an "ideal" measure.
What is the ideal measure? We assume it should satisfy three
properties. First, the measure should be effective at finding faults. A
measure is effective if an engineer would find a fault more quickly
using the measure than not. Following Parnin and Orson, and in the
absence of user trials to validate it, we assume that experiment can
estimate a measure’s effectiveness by determining how often a fault
is within the top "handful" of most suspicious lines of code under
the measure [39]. Second, the measure should be lightweight. A
measure is lightweight if an algorithm can compute it fast enough
that an impatient developer does not lose interest. The current
gold standard in speed is spectrum-based, whose values usually
take seconds to compute and scale to large programs [51]. Third,
an ideal measure should compute meaningful values that describe
more than simply which lines of code are more/less "suspicious"
than others. A canonical meaningful value is the likelihood, under
probability theory, that the given code was faulty.
Debugging is an instance of the scientific method: developers
observe, hypothesise about causes, experiment by running code,
then crucially update their hypotheses. Doric allows the definition
of fault localisation measures that model this process — measures
that we can update in light of new data. In Section 3.6, we present
clu , a method for updating our cl measure that does just this.
To advance the search for an ideal measure, we propose a ground-
up re-foundation of statistical fault localisation based on probability
theory. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose Doric: a new formal foundation for statistical
fault localisation. Using Doric, we derive a causal likelihood
measure and integrate it into a novel localisation method.
• We provide a new set of fundamental fault scenarios which,
we argue, any statistical fault localisation method should
analyze correctly. We show our new method does so, but
that no sbh can.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of cl in, what is to our
knowledge, the largest-scale fault localisation experiment
to date: cl is more accurate than all 127 known sbhs, and
when a developer investigates only 6 non-faulty lines, no
sbh outperforms it on Defects4J where the developer would
find a fault 41.18% of the time.
All of the tooling and artefacts needed to reproduce our results
are available at utopia.com.
2 PRELIMINARIES
To reconstruct statistical fault localisation (sfl) from the ground
up, we must precisely define our terms. sfl conventionally assumes
a number of artifacts are available. This includes a program (to
perform fault localisation on), a test suite (to test the program on),
and some units under test located inside the program (as candi-
dates for a fault) [45]. From these, we define coverage matrices,
the formal object at the heart of many statistical fault localisation
techniques [51], including our own.
Faulty Programs. Following Steimann et al.’s terminology [45],
a faulty program is a program that fails to always satisfy a speci-
fication, which is a property expressible in some formal language
and describes the intended behavior of some part of the program.
When a specification fails to be satisfied for a given execution (i.e.,
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int main() {
int in1, in2, in3;
int least = in1;
int most = in1;
if (most < in2)
most = input2; // u1
if (most < in3)
most = in3; // u2
if (least > in2)
most = in2; // u3 (fault)
if (least > in3)
least = in3; // u4
assert(least <= most)
}
Figure 1: minmax.c.

u1 u2 u3 u4 e
t1 0 1 1 0 1
t2 0 0 1 1 1
t3 0 0 1 0 1
t4 1 0 0 1 0
t5 1 1 0 0 0

Figure 2: Coverage Matrix.
Vector Oracle
t1 ⟨1, 0, 2⟩ fail
t2 ⟨2, 0, 1⟩ fail
t3 ⟨2, 0, 2⟩ fail
t4 ⟨1, 2, 0⟩ pass
t5 ⟨0, 1, 2⟩ pass
Figure 3: Test Suite.
an error occurs), we assume there exists some lines of code in the
program that cause the error for that execution, identified as the
fault (aka bug).
Example 2.1. An example of a faulty c program is given in Fig. 1
(minmax.c), taken from Groce et al. [16]). We use it as our run-
ning example throughout this paper. Some executions of minmax.c
violate the specification least <= most (i.e., there are some exe-
cutions where there is an error). Accordingly, in these executions,
a corresponding assertion (the last line of the program) is violated.
Thus, the program fails to always satisfy the specification. The fault
in this example is labeled u3, which should be an assignment to
least instead of most.
Test Suites. Each program has a set of test cases called a test
suite T . Following Steimann et al. [45], a test case is a repeatable
execution of some part of a program. We assume each test case is
associated with an input vector to the program and some oracle
which describes whether the test case fails or passes. A test case
fails if, by executing the program on the test case’s input vector,
the resulting execution violates a given specification, and passes
otherwise.
Example 2.2. The test case associated with input vector ⟨0, 1, 2⟩
is an execution in which in1 is assigned 0, in2 is assigned 1, and
in3 is assigned 2, the uuts labelled u1, u2 are executed, but the
uuts labelled u3 and u4, are not executed. As the specification
least <= most is satisfied in that execution (i.e. there is no vi-
olation to the assertion statement), an error does not occur. For
the running example we assume a test suite exists consisting of
five test cases T = {t1, . . . , t5}. Each test case is associated with an
input vector and oracle as described in Figure 3. For our example of
minmax.c, the oracle is an error report which tells the engineer in
a commandline message whether the assertion has been violated
or not.
Name Expression
Ochiai ef
2
(ef +nf )(ef +ep)
D3 ef
3
ep+nf
Zoltar ef
ef +nf +ep+ 10000nf epef
GP05 (ef +np)
√
ef
(ef +ep)(npnf +√ep)(ep+np)√ |ep−np |
Naish e f − epep+np+1
Table 1: Some Suspiciousness Functions
Units Under Test. A unit under test (uut) is a concrete arti-
fact in a given program. Intuitively, a uut can be thought of as
a candidate for being faulty. The collection of uuts is chosen by
software engineer, according to their requirements. Many types
of uuts have been used in the literature, including methods [44],
blocks [3, 12], branches [41], and statements [21, 30, 53]. A uut
is said to be covered by a test case if that test case executes the
uut. Notationally, we define a set of units as U . For notational
convenience in the definition of coverage matrics, U also contains
a special unit e , called the error, that a test case covers if it fails. We
letU ∗ = U − {e} andU |U | = e .
Example 2.3. In Figure 1, the uuts are the statements labeled
in comments marked u1, . . . , u4. Accordingly, the set of units is
U = {u1,u2,u3,u4, e}.
Coverage Matrices. A useful way to represent the coverage
details of a test suite is in the form of a coverage matrix. It will first
help to introduce some notation. For a matrix c , we let ci,k be the
value of the ith column and kth row of c .
Definition 2.4. A coverage matrix is a Boolean matrix c of height
|T | and width |U |, where for each ui ∈ U and tk ∈ T :
ci,k =
{
1 if tk covers ui
0 otherwise
We abbreviate c |U |,k with ek . Intuitively, for allui ∈ U ∗, ci,k = 0
just in case tk executed ui , and 0 otherwise. ek = 1 just in case
tk fails, and 0 otherwise. We use the notational abbreviations of
Souza etal [10].
∑
k is
∑ |T |
k=1.
∑
k ci,kek is cief . Intuitively, this is
the number of test cases that execute ui and fail.
∑
k ci,kek is cief .
Intuitively, this is the number of test cases that do not execute ui
but fail.
∑
k ci,kek is ciep . Intuitively, this is the number of test cases
that execute ui and pass.
∑
k ci,kek is cinp . Intuitively, this is the
number of test cases that do not execute ui but pass. When the
context is clear, we drop the leading c and the index i . A coverage
matrix for the running example is given in Fig. 2.
Spectrum-Based Heuristics. One way to measure the suspi-
ciousness of a given unit wrt how faulty it is is to use a spectrum-
based heuristic, sometimes called a spectrum-based "suspicious-
ness" measure [10].
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Definition 2.5. A spectrum-based heuristic (sbh) is a function
s with signature s : U ∗ → R. For each u ∈ U ∗ s(ui ) is called
ui ’s degree of suspiciousness, and is defined as a function of ui ’s
spectrum, which is the vector ⟨cief , cinf , ciep , cinp ⟩.
The intuition behind sbh’s is that s(ui ) > s(uj ) just in case ui
is more "suspicious" wrt being faulty than uj . In spectrum-based
fault localisation (sbfl), uuts are inspected by the engineer in
descending order of suspiciousness until a fault is found. When two
units are equally suspicious some tie-breaking method is assumed.
One method is choosing the unit which appears earlier in the code
to inspect first. We shall assume this method in this paper.
We discuss a property of some sbh’s. If a suspiciousness function
s is single fault optimal then for allui ,uj ∈ U , if cief = cief +cinf and
cief > c
j
ef , then s(ui ) > s(uj ). Intuitively, this states if a measure
is single-fault optimal then uuts executed by all failing traces are
more suspicious than ones that aren’t [28, 36]. This property is
based on the observation that the fault will be executed by all
failing test cases in a program with only one fault. An example of a
single fault optimal measure is the Naish measure (see Table 1).
Example 2.6. To illustrate how an sbh can be used in sbfl, we
perform sbflwith Wong-II measure s(ui ) = cief −ciep =
∑
k ci,kek −∑
k ci,kek [54] on the running example. s(u1) = -2, s(u2) = 0, s(u3)
= 3, and s(u4) = 2. Thus the most suspicious uut (u3) is successfully
identified with the fault. Accordingly, in a practical instance of sbfl
the fault will be investigated first by the engineer.
3 DORIC: NEW FOUNDATIONS
We present Doric1, our formal framework based on probability
theory. We proceed in four steps. First, we define a set of models
to represent the universe of possibilities. Each model represents a
possible way the error could have been caused (Section 3.1). Second,
we define a syntax to express hypotheses, such as "the ith uut was
a cause of the error" and a semantics that maps a hypothesis to
the set of models where it is true (Section 3.2). Third, we outline
a general theory of probability (Section 3.3). Then, we develop
a classical interpretation of probability (Section 3.4). Using this
interpretation, we define a measure usable for fault localisation
(Section 3.5). Finally, we present our fault localisation methods 3.6.
3.1 The Models of Doric
In our framework, classical probabilities are defined in terms
of the proportion of models in which a given formula is true. To
achieve this, we first define a set of models for our system. We
first describe some notation used in the forthcoming definition of
models here. Let j ∈ N andmj be a matrix, thenmji,k is the value
of the cell located at the ith column and kth row of matrix mj ,
where this value is in {1, 0, •}. As with coverage matrices, the rows
represent test cases and the columns represent units. Informally,
for each cellmji,k , 0 denotes ui was neither executed by tk nor a
cause of the error e , 1 denotes ui was executed but was not a cause
of e , and • denotes ui was executed by tk and was a cause of e .
1Given our goal of providing a simple foundation to statistical fault localisation, we
name our framework after this simple type of Greek column

0 • • 0 1
0 0 • • 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0


0 • • 0 1
0 0 • 1 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0


0 • • 0 1
0 0 1 • 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0

0 • 1 0 1
0 0 • • 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0


0 • 1 0 1
0 0 • 1 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0


0 • 1 0 1
0 0 1 • 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0

0 1 • 0 1
0 0 • • 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0


0 1 • 0 1
0 0 • 1 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0


0 1 • 0 1
0 0 1 • 1
0 0 • 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0

Figure 4: Causal Models.
Definition 3.1. Let T be a test suite and U a set of units. The set
of models for a coverage matrix c is a set of matricesM = {m1, . . . ,
m |M |} of height |T | and width |U | satisfying:
m
j
i,k ∈
{
{1, •} if ci,kek = 1 & i , |U |
{ci,k } otherwise
where for each tk ∈ T there is some ui ∈ U such thatmji,k = •.
Informally, each model (also called a causal model) describes
a possible scenario in which errors were caused. The scenario is
epistemically possible — logically possible and (we have assumed)
consistent with what the engineer knows. Underlying our definition
are three assumptions about the nature of causation. First, causation
is factive: if a unit causes an error in a given test case, then the uut
has to be executed and the error both have to factually obtain for
a causal relation to hold between them. Second, errors are caused:
if an error occurs in a given test case, then the execution of some
uut caused it. Third, causation is irreflexive: no error causes itself.
Example 3.2. The set of causal models M of the running ex-
ample is given in Fig. 4. Following Def. 3.1, there are 9 models
{m1, . . . ,m9}.M represents all the different combinations of ways
uuts can be said to be a cause of the error in each test case. In
Fig. 4, we associatem1,m2,m3 with the top three models,m4,m5,
m6 with the middle three models, andm7,m8,m9 with the bottom
three models.
3.2 The Syntax and Semantics of Doric
What sort of hypotheses does the engineer want to estimate the
likelihood of? In this section, we present a language fundamental to
the fault localisation task. This language includes hypotheses about
which line of code was faulty, which caused the error in which test
case, etc. We develop such a language as follows. First, we define a
set of basic partial causal hypotheses H = {h1, . . . ,h |U |}, where hi
has the reading "the ith uut was a cause of the error". Second, we
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define set of basic propositions U = {ui , . . . ,u |U |}, where ui here
takes a propositional reading "the ith uut was executed".
Definition 3.3. L is called the language, defined inductively over
a given set of basic propositions U and causal hypotheses H as
follows:
(1) if ϕ ∈ U ∪ H , then ϕ ∈ L
(2) if ϕ,ψ ∈ L, then ϕ ∧ψ ,¬ψ ,^kϕ ∈ L, for each tk ∈ T
We use the following abbreviations and readings . ϕ ∨ψ abbre-
viates ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ), read "ϕ orψ ". ϕ ∧ψ is read "ϕ andψ ". ϕ ∨ψ is
read "ϕ orψ ". ¬ϕ is read "it is not the case that ϕ". ^kϕ is read "ϕ
in the kth test case". e is read "the error occurred". In addition, we
define L∗, called the basic language, which is a subset of L defined
as follows: If ui ∈ U then ui ∈ L∗, if ϕ,ψ ∈ L, then ϕ ∧ψ ,¬ϕ ∈ L.
An important feature of L is that we abbreviate two additional
types of hypotheses, as follows: First, Hi is hi
∧
hj ∈H−{hi } ¬hj ,
where Hi is read "the ith uut was the cause of the error", is called a
total causal hypothesis for the error, and intuitively abbreviates the
property that the ith unit was a cause of the error, and nothing else
was. Second, we let fi is abbreviated
∨
tk ∈T ^khi , where fi is read
"the ith uut is a fault", is called a fault hypothesis, and intuitively
abbreviates the property that the ith unit was a cause of the error
in some test case.
We now treat the semantics of Doric. To determine which propo-
sitions in the language L are true in which modelsM , we provide
valuation functions mapping propositions to models, as follows:
Definition 3.4. LetM be a set of models and let L be the language.
Then the set of valuations is a set V = {v1, . . . ,v |V |}, where for
each tk ∈ T there is some vk ∈ V with signature vk : L → 2M ,
defined inductively as follows:
(1) vk (ui ) = {mj ∈ M |mji,k ∈ {1, •}}, for ui ∈ U
(2) vk (hi ) = {mj ∈ M |mji,k = •}, for hi ∈ H
(3) vk (ϕ ∧ψ ) = vk (ϕ) ∩vk (ψ ), for ϕ,ψ ∈ L
(4) vk (¬ϕ) =M −vk (ϕ), for ϕ ∈ L
(5) vk (^nϕ) = vn (ϕ), for ϕ ∈ L
vk (ϕ) is read "the models where ϕ in the kth test case". We give
an example to illustrate.
Example 3.5. We continue with the running example. Each of the
following can be visually verified by checking the causal models in
Figure 4. v1(u1) = ∅. Intuitively, this is because t1 executes u1 in no
models. v1(u2) = M . Intuitively, this is because t1 executes u1 in all
models. v1(h2) = {m1, . . . ,m6} = M − {m7,m8,m9}. Accordingly,
u1 was a cause of the error in 6 out of 9 models. In contrast,v1(H2) =
v1(h2 ∧¬h1 ∧¬h3 ∧¬h4) = {m4,m5,m6}. Accordingly, u2 was the
cause of the error in 3 out of 9 models. Finally, v1(⋄3h3) = v3(h3) =
M . Accordingly, in the third test case the 3rd uut was a cause of
the error.
3.3 The Probability Theory of Doric
We want to determine the probability of a given hypothesis.
We do this by presenting our theory of probability. The theory is
based around the following assumptions: We assume the engineer
does not always know which hypotheses are true of each test case.
Accordingly, we want our probabilities about hypotheses to take
an epistemic interpretation, in which the probabilities describe how
much a given hypothesis should be believed.
Definition 3.6. Let M,L,V be non-empty sets of models, a lan-
guage and set of valuations respectively. Then, a probability theory
is a tuple ⟨P, P ,w⟩, where
(1) w : 2M → R
(2) P = {P1, . . . , P |T |} is a set of probability functions, where for
each vk ∈ V there is some Pk ∈ P such that
Pk (ϕ) =
w(vk (ϕ))
w(M) , for each ϕ ∈ L (1)
(3) P is the expected likelihood function defined as follows:
P(ϕ) =
∑
k
Pk (ϕ)
|T | , for each ϕ ∈ L (2)
The weight function is w and describes the relative likelihood
of a set of models. Pk (ϕ) is the probability that ϕ holds in the kth
test case, and is defined as the proportion of models in which ϕ
holds. P(ϕ) is the expected likelihood that ϕ, and is defined as the
average probability that ϕ holds in a test case. We use the following
readings:w(X ) is "the relative likelihood of the models in X". Pk (ϕ)
is "the probability that ϕ in the kth test case". P(ϕ) is "the expected
likelihood that ϕ". We use the standard abbreviation of P(ϕ |ψ ) for
P(ϕ ∧ψ )/P(ψ ), which reads "the probability that ϕ whenψ ".
We now discuss immutable assumptions onw . In order to ensure
Pk satisfies standard measure theoretic properties, we assumew(∅)
= 0,w(M) > 0, andw(X ∪ Y ) = w(X ) +w(Y ) when X ∩ Y = ∅. We
allow any extension to the definition ofw satisfying the above prop-
erties. Whenw is so defined, we say it provides an interpretation
of the probability functions. For instance, one option is to formally
define the relative likelihood of models in terms of the number of
faults in them.
Finally, we establish the intuitive result that the likelihood of
a given formula in the basic language is simply the proportion of
test cases in which it is true. Let f be a function which intuitively
measures the frequency in which a proposition is true in a test
suite. Defined: f (ϕ) = ∑ fk (ϕ), where fk (ϕ) = 1 if vk (ϕ) = M and
0 otherwise. We then have the following result:
Proposition 3.7. For all ϕ ∈ L∗, P(ϕ) = f (ϕ)|T |
Proof. See Appendix. □
Using this result, we can identify many sbh’s with an intu-
itive probabilistic expression stated within Doric. For example,
P(ui ∧ e) = cief /|T |, P(ui ∧ ¬e) = ciep/|T |, P(¬ui ∧ ¬e) = cinp/|T |,
and P(¬ui ∧ e) = cinf /|T |. Using these four identities alone one
can express the 40 sbh’s of Lucia etal. [32], and the 20 causal and
confirmation sbh’s of Landsberg at al. [26, 28].
3.4 Classical Interpretation
What conditions hold on the relative likelihood function? The
question here is which causal models are more likely than others.
To illustrate our framework, we will impose conditions on the
relative likelihood function to give us a classical interpretation of
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probability. Informally, probability has a classical interpretation if it
satisfies the condition that if there are a total ofnmutually exclusive
possibilities, the probability of one of them being true is 1/n [19].
The rationale for this is the principle of indifference (aka the principle
of insufficient reason), which states that if there are a total of n
mutually exclusive possibilities, and there is not sufficient reason
to believe one over the other, then their relative likelihoods are
equal. Formally, for all x ,y ∈ M ,w({x}) = w({y}). This condition
is also known to describe a uniform distribution over the set of
models. In the remainder of this paper, we assume this condition.
The assumption is sufficient for the following result:
Pk (ϕ) =
|vk (ϕ)|
|M | , for each ϕ ∈ L (3)
Proposition 3.8. Equation 3 follows given indifference
Proof. See Appendix. □
Intuitively, the probability of a proposition is the ratio of models
in which it is true. Equation 3 is tantamount to assuming that,
ab initio, the engineer knows next to nothing about what caused
the error in each test case (each causal model is equally likely). In
practice, we think is probably wrong for the purposes of software
fault localisation (causal models with a small number of faults are
probably more likely). The main reason for its assumption is that
it keeps our forthcoming fault localisation methods simple and
tractable.
We now illustrate how we can use the classical interpretation
to give us a definition of P(fi ). Following our readings, P(fi ) mea-
sures the likelihood the ith unit was a fault. This describes is the
proportion of models where i is a cause of the error in some test
case (Intuitively, P(fi ) is the the proportion of models where there
is a "•" somewhere in the ith column of a model). We call this
measure a measure of fault-likelihood. Accordingly, the assumption
of indifference gives us the following result. Let i ∈ [0, |U |] and
m, t ∈ [0, |T |] be free variables, and let ρk = ∑ui ∈U ∗c j,k , then:
P(fi ) = P(
|T |∨
k=1
^khi ) (4)
P(
|T |∨
k=m
^khi ) = (1 − Pk (hi )P(
|T |∨
j=k+1
^jhi )) + Pk (hi ) (5)
Pt (hi ) =
{
2ρt −1
2ρt −1 if ci,tet = 1
0 otherwise
(6)
Proposition 3.9. Equations 4, 5, & 6 follow given indifference.
Proof. See Appendix. □
On the running example, the equations can be used to find
P(f1) = 0, P(f2) = P(f4) = 2/3, P(f3) = 1.
3.5 Measure for Fault Localisation
To develop an efficient fault localisation method based on our
framework, we need to do two things. First, we need to identify a
probabilistic expression which tells us which unit should be inves-
tigated first when looking for faults. Second, we need to identify
an efficient way to compute this. In this section, we address these
issues in turn.
Which unit should be investigated first when looking for faults?
To answer this, it is tempting to answer — the unit which is the
most likely fault (maxui ∈U ∗ P(fi )). However, under the classical
interpretation, this will be ineffective for fault localisation as it
ignores passing test cases. Moreover, we do not think that this is
necessarily the unit which should be investigated first. Rather, we
think that the unit which is estimated to have the highest propensity
to cause the error should be investigated first. To see the difference,
we observe that something might have a high fault-likelihood, but
simultaneously have a low propensity to cause errors. Think of
a rarely executed bug — we think these will be of less interest to
an engineer. Accordingly, the measure we should use will be an
expression describing this propensity.
We make two assumptions in our development. First, we make
the assumption that it is possible to find the cause, as opposed to
a cause, where finding the cause is preferable. Second, following
Popper [40], we assume the propensity of some x to y is described
by probabilistic expressions of the form P(y |x). Accordingly, the
propensity of a unit to cause an error can be analogously described
in our framework with P(Hi |ui ). Following our readings of this
section, this is read "the likelihood a given uut was the cause of
an error when it was executed". We call this measure a measure
of causal likelihood (or cl for short), and for some cases is able to
identity a some faults with certainty, in the sense that if P(Hi |ui ) = 1
then P(fi ) = 1. Our answer to our question is thus maxui ∈U ∗
P(Hi |ui ).
We now address the question of how to compute cl efficiently.
One option is to generate all the matrices in the set of causal models,
and (following our assumption of indifference) find the probability
directly by counting models. However, this is intractable in general.
A more tractable alternative is to find an expression for P(Hi |ui )
which is stated purely as a function of a given coverage matrix c
and is also tractable. We present this in Eq. 7 and show it follows
from the definitions of this section. As follows: Let c be a given
coverage matrix. Let ρk abbreviate
∑
uj ∈U ∗ c j,k . Informally, ρk is
the number of units executed by tk . Then for each ui ∈ U ∗:
P(Hi |ui ) =
∑
k ci,kek
−2ρk −1∑
k ci,k
(7)
Proposition 3.10. Equation 7 follows using the definitions.
Proof. To aid in the proof, it will be useful to establish the
following equations. Let t ∈ [1, |T |] and i ∈ [1, |U |], then:
P(Hi |ui ) = P(Hi ∧ ui )
P(ui ) (8)
P(Hi ∧ ui ) = P(Hi ) (9)
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P(Hi ) =
∑
k
Pk (Hi )
|T | (10)
Pt (Hi ) =
{
1/(2ρt − 1) if ci,t , et = 1
0 otherwise
(11)
P(ui ) =
∑
k
ci,k
|T | (12)
We now sketch the proof of these equations. 8 follows by the def-
inition of conditional probability. 10 follows by def. 3.6. It remains
to give the proofs for equations 9, 11 and 12. As these are longer
they are consigned to the appendix in proposition A.3.
Finally, it is easily observed that Eq. 7 holds using equations 8-12.
As follows: P(Hi |ui ) = P(Hi |ui )/P(ui ) (by Eq.8). Thus, P(Hi |ui ) =
P(Hi )/P(ui ) (by Eq.9). So, P(Hi |ui ) = ∑k Pk (Hi )/|T |/P(ui ) (by
Eq.10). Thus, P(Hi |ui ) = ∑k (Pk (Hi )/|T |)/(∑k ci,k/|T |) (by Eq.12).
So, P(Hi |ui ) = ∑k Pk (Hi )/∑k ci,k (by cancellation). It remains to
show that Pk (Hi ) = ci,kek/2ρk−1. Assume ci,k , ek = 1. Then by
the first condition of Eq. 11 Pk (Hi ) = 1/2ρk−1. This is equal to
ci,kek/2ρk−1 by our assumption. Assume it is not the case that
ci,k , ek = 1. Then by the second condition of Eq. 11 Pk (Hi ) = 0.
Now, as either ci,k or ek is 0 (by def. 2), ci,kek = 0, and thus
ci,kek/2ρk−1 = 0. Thus, Pk (Hi ) = ci,kek/2ρk−1. □
Example 3.11. To illustrate cl, we find P(Hi |ui ) for each ofu1, . . . ,u4
for the the running example of minmax.c. We begin with P(H1 |u1).
We begin by evaluating the numerator of Eq. 7, which is equal to
(0x0)/(22 − 1) + (0 × 0)/(22 − 1) + (0 × 0)/(21 − 1) + (1 × 0)/(22 −
1) + (1 × 0)/(22 − 1) = 0. The denominator is equal to 2. Thus
P(H2 |u2) = 0/2 = 0. We now do P(H2 |u2). The numerator is equal
to (1×1)/(22−1) + (1×0)/(22−1) + (1×0)/(21−1) + (0×0)/(22−1)
+ (0× 1)/(22 − 1) = (1× 1)/(22 − 1) = 1/3. The denominator is equal
to 2. Thus P(H2 |u2) = (1/3)/2 = 1/6. P(H3 |u3) = (1/3 + 1/3 + 1) /
3 = 0.5, and P(H4 |u4) = (1/3)/2 = 0.16. Accordingly, the fault u3 is
estimated to have the highest likelihood of causing an error when
executed.
We now discuss time-complexity. It is observed that the time
complexity of computing the value of both fault and causal likeli-
hood (P(fi ) and P(Hi |ui ) respectively) is a (small) constant function
of the size of the given coverage matrix. This makes it comparable
to spectrum-based heuristics in terms of efficiency, which also has
this property. To answer our stated question explicitly, to compute
maxui ∈U ∗ P(Hi |ui ) efficiently we can simply compute Equation 7
for each ui ∈ U using the given coverage matrix c , and return the
unit with the highest likelihood.
Finally, we illustrate how our measures of fault and causal like-
lihood provide a small armory of meaningful measures useful to
the engineer. Returning the running example, the engineer might
assume the principle of insufficient reason and say of the third unit
"the probability it is a fault is 1" and "will likely cause the error
when executed" (given P(f3) = 1 and P(H3 |u3) > 12 respectively).
We think these quantities are more meaningful than what is re-
ported by some of most effective established sbh’s customized to
sbfl. For instance "the GP05 measure reports the third unit to have
a suspiciousness degree of 0.5576" does not have the same meaning,
or suggest actionability to the engineer in the same way.
3.6 Semi-Automated Methods
We now address the question of how to use Eq 7 in a fault localisa-
tion method. We present two such methods. We then compare our
methods to sbfl.
Our first method is similar to the sbfl procedure discussed in
Section 2. Here, each ui ∈ U is associated with a causal likelihood,
as determined by using Eq. 7. The engineer then inspects uuts in
the program in descending order of causal likelihood (also called
suspiciousness) until a fault is found. When two units are equally
suspicious, the unit higher up in the code is inspected first. We call
this procedure cln (which abbreviated "causal likelihood with no
updating").
We now present our second method. We begin with some mo-
tivation. To start the fault localisation process, we assume the en-
gineer will want to investigate maxui ∈U ∗ (P(Hi |ui )). However, in
the course of further investigation about the program, the engineer
will discover new facts, symbolized ϕ (for some ϕ ∈ L). To find
faults, the engineer will then want to find the causal likelihood of
different units given those facts. Accordingly, the unit the engineer
should investigate next should be given by the following formula:
max
ui ∈U ∗
(P(Hi |ui ∧ ϕ)) (13)
The above motivates our second method, which is described
as follows. First, ϕ is set to a tautology, and the value of Eq. 13 is
computed. Suppose the unit returned by Eq. 13 is uj . Then, if uj
is inspectd by the engineer, and if found to be faulty, the search
terminates. If not, we assume ¬hj and compute the value of Eq. 13
letting ϕ = ¬hj . Suppose the unit returned is uk . The process is
similar to before — if uj is faulty, the search terminates. If not, we
assume ¬hk and compute the value of Eq. 13 letting ϕ = ¬hj ∧¬hk .
The search continues in this way until a fault is found. We call this
procedure clu ("causal likelihood with updating"). Characteristic
of clu is that clues discovered throughout the investigation can be
used to give us new probabilities.
We now discuss implementation details of the second method.
In a practical implementation, we can use Equation 7 in the fol-
lowing way. Let F ⊆ H be the set of indices to causal hypotheses
known to be false. Then we can compute Eq. 13 by redefining ρk
as
∑
uj ∈U c j,k −
∑
hn ∈F cn,k , and use the expression on the rhs of
Eq. 7 to find the value of the argument of Eq. 13. Proof of this is
included in an extended version of this paper. Secondly, in a prac-
tical implementation, we also allowed ourselves to limit the size
of F (called an update bound), which represents the number of
updates an engineer is willing to make. If an update bound is set
and reached, then clu procedure continues without any further
updates.
We now discuss valuable formal properties pertaining to the
second method. We observe that the process of fault localisation is
much like a game of hide and seek — insofar as when an engineer
inspects one location for a fault and it is not there, then our estima-
tions for the likelihood it is elsewhere should increase. We think
it is desirable for a fault localisation method to satisfy a similar
property. Accordingly, in this section we show that conditioning
on causal likelihood (as per the method of clu ) satisfies a similar
property, as follows:
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Proposition 3.12. Let c be a coverage matrix where ci,k = c j,k =
1 for some tk ∈ T . Then P(Hi |ui ) < P(Hi |ui ∧ ¬hj ).
Proof. See Appendix. □
In the remainder of this section, we compare our new methods
with sbfl in light of two new fundamental fault scenarios which,
we argue, any statistical fault localisation method should analyze
correctly.
[ u1 u2 u3 e
t1 1 1 0 1
t2 0 0 1 1
]
Consider the coverage matrix above. We argue that for any sbh
s to be adequate for fault localisation it should satisfy the property
that s(u3) > s(u2). Our reasoning follows from the assumption that,
when an error occurs, there is some executed uut that was a cause
of it. Accordingly, we can be certain that u3 is a fault — nothing
else could have caused the error in the second test case. However,
we are not certain that u2 is a fault (as far as we know u1 could
have caused the error instead in the first test case). However, it is
impossible for any sbh to satisfy s(u3) > s(u2), because spectrum for
u3 and u2 is the same (i.e. ⟨c2ef , c2nf , c2ep , c2np ⟩ = ⟨c3ef , c3nf , c3ep , c3np ⟩
= ⟨1, 1, 0, 0⟩ — see the definition of a spectrum in def. 2.5). Thus,
their suspiciousness is the same. Subsequently, sbhs cannot handle
this fundamental case. In constrast, the measure of causal likelihood
gets the answer right, as P(H3 |u3) = 1 and P(H2 |u2) = 1/3.
[ u1 u2 u3 u4 e
t1 0 0 1 1 1
t2 1 1 0 0 1
]
Now consider the coverage matrix above. Suppose we begin
the fault localisation process, without any prior knowledge about
which units are faulty or non-faulty. Now, according to spectrum-
based functions, each unit is equally suspicious (as the spectrum
for each unit is the same = ⟨1, 1, 0, 0⟩). Suppose, following the sbfl
method, we choose to investigate u1, and discover it not to be
faulty. Accordingly, on the assumption that in every failing test
case some executed unit is a cause of the error, we can now be
certain that u2 is a fault given this new information. However,
we cannot be so certain that either u3 or u4 is a fault (as it might
be the case it isn’t but the other is). Thus upon learning u1 isn’t
a fault, degrees of suspiciousness should be updated to make u2
more suspiciousness than u3 and u4. However, sbfl is inadequate
for fault localisation because it has no facility for updates of this
sort. In contrast, as a consequence of Proposition 3.12 the clu
method gets it right. At step one, for all ui ∈ U , P(Hi |ui ) = 1/3.
Suppose the engineer learns u1 is not faulty. Thus, the engineer
evaluates all ui ∈ U − {u1} next. P(H2 |u2 ∧ ¬h1) = 1, and remain
P(H3 |u3 ∧ ¬h1) = P(H3 |u3 ∧ ¬h1) = 1/3.
4 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the performance of our newmethods
with all known 127 sbhs on large faulty programs. The goal of the
experiment is to establish whether cln and clu are effective at fault
localisation than sbhs .
Program V LOC U F P B
Chart 24/26 50k 680 3.75 190.21 1.92
Closure 77/133 83k 3,432 2.88 3,367.40 2.52
Math 91/106 19k 346 1.74 168.80 3.10
Time 20/27 53k 1,204 2.20 2,542.85 4.10
Lang 50/65 6k 96 2.16 98.26 2.62
Mockito 27/38 - 574 3.78 744.96 2.59
Table 2: Statistics about Defects4j Benchmarks
Program V M U F P
AC_Codec_1.3 543 265 188 5.35 16.04
AC_Lang_3.0 599 5373 1,666 4.22 44.84
Daikon_4.6.4 352 14387 157 1.66 30.06
Draw2d_3.4.2 570 3231 89 6.71 60.73
Eventbus_1.4 577 859 91 8.19 75.70
Htmlparser_1.6 599 3231 600 41.70 379.17
Jaxen_1.1.5 600 1689 695 70.29 581.25
Jester_1.37b 411 378 64 5.09 22.94
Jexel_1.0.0b13 537 242 335 23.15 261.39
Jparsec_2.0 598 1011 510 13.14 293.59
Table 3: Statistics about Steimann’s Benchmarks.
4.1 Setup
We first present the benchmarks used in our experiment, then
describe the methods compared in the experiment, the methods we
used to evaluate the performance of the different methods. Finally,
we present some research questions for our experiment to answer.
We first describe the benchmarks used in our experiments. We
use two sets of Java benchmarks, Defects4j and Steimann’s. Each set
of benchmarks contains different programs, each program is associ-
ated with different initial faulty versions, and each faulty version is
associated with a test suite (which includes some failing test cases)
and a method for identifying the faulty uuts. Statistics for the two
sets of benchmarks are presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. The
first column gives the name of the program, the second the number
of initial faulty versions (V), the third the number of tested units
(lines of code (loc) for Defects4j, methods (M) for Steimann). The
fourth gives the (rounded) average number of units represented in
a coverage matrix for the initial faulty versions (U). The number of
units represented in the matrix is always smaller than the number
of tested units, as columns in the coverage matrix were removed in
our experiments if the corresponding unit was not executed by a
failing test case (such units are assumed non-faulty). The fifth and
sixth columns give the average number of failing (F) and passing
(P) test cases represented in a coverage matrix for each initial faulty
version. in Table 2, The last column gives the average number of
faulty units represented in each coverage matrix for each initial
faulty version (B). In the case of Steimann’s each initial version
always had one injected fault, so we have not included that column
for its corresponding table. Finally, we could not find a reliable
source for the number of lines of code for Mockito. We now discuss
particular details about the two sets of benchmarks.
The first set of benchmarks are taken from the Defects4J reposi-
tory. This is a database consisting of Java program versions with
real bugs fixed by developers, and are described in detail by René
et al. [23]. As the authors confirm, not all of the versions were usable
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with software fault localisation methods. A version was unusable if
it had a list of faults which did not correspond to an executed line
of code (and thus the techniques considered in this paper would not
be able to find them). This was because the faults in these versions
include omissions of code. Thus, the proportion of usable versions
are reported in the Vs column of Table 2 (for instance 24/26 versions
were usable for Chart). To generate coverage matrices, we used
pre-existent code from the Defects4J repository.2
The second set are the Steimann benchmarks. This is a database
of large Java programs with injected faults introduced via mutation
testing, and are described in detail by Steimann et al. [45]. The
benchmarks are described in Table 2. To generate multiple fault
versions, the authors also created one thousand 2,4,8,16, and 32 fault
versions, which were created by combining fault injections from
the original 1-fault versions. This meant there were a total of 50K+
program versions associated with our second set of benchmarks.
We used pre-existent code to generate coverage matrices for us,
provided to use by the compilers of the benchmarks [45].
We now discuss the methods we compare in our experiments.
We wish to compare sbfl methods with the methods developed in
this paper. We describe these in turn. We include in our comparison
127 different sbhs . These measures are described in Landsberg [26],
and is an attempt at an exhaustive list of sbhs available in the
literature3. As a baseline for our comparison, we also compared
the constant measure (which returns a constant value). We also
compare clu (with an update bound of 20). Finally, we also compare
cln when used as a substitute sbfl measure for the sbfl procedure
discussed in Section 2. This allowed us to compare the benefits of
updating.
We now discuss our methods of evaluation. The methods we
compare all follow the same format insofar as one inspects more
suspicious units first, with units which feature higher up in the code
inspected first in the case of ties. We wish to evaluate a method in
terms of how quickly a fault would be found using this approach.
Accordingly, First, for each coverage matrix, a method’s accuracy
is defined as the number of non-faulty units investigated using the
technique until a fault is found. A method’s accuracy for a given
set of coverage matrices associated with that benchmark is defined
as the average accuracy for that set. For a given set of coverage
matrices, the most accurate method is the one with the lowest
accuracy score.
The secondmethod of evaluation is as follows. For a given cut-off
of n and a given set of coverage matrices, a method’s n-score is the
percentage of times a fault is found by investigating n non-faulty
units using the method. For a set of coverage matrices and given n,
the method with the best n-score is the one with the highest n-score.
We provide values ofn in the range [0,10]. Following the suggestions
of Parnin and Orso [39], we provide this range as we think 10 units
is a realistic upper bound on the number of units an engineer will
investigate using a given method. Accuracy and n-scores off score
are both called a method’s scores in general. For each of our sets of
benchmarks, the overall accuracy score was the average accuracy
over all coverage matrices in that set of benchmarks.
2https://github.com/rjust/defects4j
3Following established conventions on avoiding divisions by zero with the sbhs, we
added 0.5 to each of the elements of a spectrum [28, 36]
Figure 5: Performance of cln on Steimann’s benchmarks
with different numbers of faults.
Figure 6: Performance of somemethods on Defects4j bench-
marks.
We now discuss our research questions. Accordingly, for each of
our benchmarks, our experimental setup is designed to help answer
the following research questions:
(1) Which method is the most accurate?
(2) Do our new techniques have the bestn-scores for n ∈ [0, 10]?
Finally, all of our results can be reproduced. The Steimann bench-
marks can be downloaded from http://www.feu.de/ps/prjs/EzUnit/
eval/ISSTA13/. The Defects4J benchmarks can be downloaded from
https://github.com/rjust/defects4j. All the sbh ’s compared are avail-
able in [26, 28].
4.2 Results
We first directly answer our two research questions. First, Which
method is the most accurate? For Defects4j cln has the best accu-
racy score (213.6). For Steimann’s benchmarks, clu has the best
accuracy score (4.9) (cln came second with 5.02). Second, Do our
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new techniques have the best n-scores for any n ∈ [0, 10]? For
Defects4j, cln had the best 6-score (41.18). For Steimann’s bench-
marks, for all n ∈ [0, 10], clu had the best n-scores for each of the
sets of 4, 8, 16, 32 faults. cln had the second best scores in these
cases.
We first discuss the results for Defects4j, and begin with the
overall accuracy scores. To show the range, we report the measures
which were ranked 1, 2, 10, 50, 90, 100. These were cln (213.6), D3
(216.36), Lewis (224.79), AddedValue (232.46), clu (241.22) Gower
(248.72) respectively. The constant measure was ranked last (643.78).
We now summarise the n-scores for each n ∈ [0, 10]. The n-scores
for a range of methods are presented in Figure 6. We describe the
figure as follows. For each method in the legend, a point was plotted
at (x, y) if in y% of the versions a fault was localized after investigat-
ing x non-faulty lines of code. To show the range of performance
across methods, the methods in the legend are associated with the
aforementioned methods. Of all 127 methods compared, clu did
not get the best n-score for any of n ∈ [0, 10], and cln tied with the
best 6-score (41.18 - tied with Dennis, Ochiai, and f9830).
We now discuss the results for Steimann’s benchmarks. We first
summarise the overall accuracy scores. To show the range of scores,
we report the methods which were ranked 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 50, 100.
These were clu (4.9), cln (5.02), Klosgen (9.02), SokalSneath4 (9.51),
calf, (9.77), Tarantula (10.54), GP23 (15.68). The constant measure
came last (38.69). We now summarise accuracy scores on sets of 1,
2, 4, 8, 16, 32 fault programs. On 1-fault programs, Naish received
the best accuracy score (9.81). clu came 72nd (14.5) and cln came
74th (14.69). On each of the sets of versions with multiple faults,
clu and cln came 1st and 2nd respectively, as follows: On 2-fault
programs, the top 3 were clu (9.87) cln and (10.04) and D3 (13.1).
On 4-fault programs, the top 3 were clu (5.14) cln and (5.3) and
GeometricMean (10.34). On 8-fault programs, the top 3 were clu
(2.79) cln and (2.94) and Klosgen (7.57). On 16-fault programs, the
top 3 were clu (1.16) cln and (1.24) and AddedValue (6.04). On 32-
fault programs, the top 3 were clu (0.4) cln and (0.44) and Certainty
(4.87).
We now summarise the n-scores. For each n ∈ [0, 10], and for
the set of 1-fault programs, Naish outperformed clu or cln at every
value n. For each n ∈ [0, 10], and for the set of 2-fault programs, D3
outperformed clu or cln at every value of n. For each n ∈ [0, 10],
and for each of the sets of 4, 8, 16, 32 fault programs, clu or cln
outperformed all sbfl methods at every value of n. clu and cln
n-scores were always similar (+/- 2 percent of on one another), thus
to give an indication of how they perform as the number of faults
grows in a program, we present Figure 6. Here, for each of the 1,
..., 32 fault programs, a point was plotted on (x, y) if in y% of the
versions a fault was localized after investigating x non-faulty lines
of code.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss our results. We
first discuss differences in value between our evaluative methods
(accuracy and n-scores). In general, n-scores are more important
than accuracy from the point of view of an engineer looking for a
technique to use in practice. As has been demonstrated in a study
by Parnin and Orso, " programmers will stop inspecting statements,
and transition to traditional debugging, if they do not get promising
results within the first few statements they inspect" [39]. n-scores
are more important from this perspective.
We now discuss the difference in quality between accuracy and
n-scores. In general, the accuracy scores for all techniques on De-
fects4j are poor. For instance, using the most accurate method cln
, one would expect to investigate 213.6 lines of code on average.
In contrast, if one limited oneself to investigating fewer than 10
non-faulty lines of code, then one would expect to find a fault al-
most half the time. For instance, using cln we can expect to find
a fault 41.68% of the time if one limited oneself to investigating 6
non-faulty lines of code (here, nothing did better than cln ). This
suggests that accuracy scores were affected by outliers in which
the technique only located a fault after investigating many lines of
code (we discuss two such outliers below).
We now discuss whymethods performed differently on Defects4j
as opposed to Steimann. First, in the useable Defects4j versions, the
average number of failing test cases way very small, as detailed by
Table 2. In contrast, the number of failing test cases in Steimann
benchmarks was much larger. We think this improved the per-
formance of different methods, as more failing tests provide more
information about the behavior of the fault. Secondly, in the useable
Defects4j versions, 38.4% had only a single failing test case. Accord-
ingly, clu , cln and most sbh’s performed equivalently on these
benchmarks in terms of which units get ranked higher/lower, this
meant that the performance of high performing methods tended
to converge. Thirdly, we emphasize that the uuts in Steimann’s
benchmarks were calls to subclasses, which are often larger than
lines of code (the units for Defects4j), and thus the scores look better
for Steimann’s benchmarks. Fourthly, for Steimann’s benchmarks
many of the failing test cases only executed a small part of the
overall program. This advantaged our new methods clu and clu ,
which take advantage of short failing executions to increase their
causal likelihood.
We now discuss the difference in accuracy between clu and cln
. As described earlier, the performance of clu is slightly worse than
cln on Defects4j, where the opposite is observed on Steimann’s
benchmarks. We investigated reasons why for this, and after inves-
tigating the cases where cln outperforms clu in terms of accuracy
on Defects4j, we discovered there were two major outliers that
made clu ’s overall accuracy score lower (in Chart-5 clu had to
investigate 3177 more lines of code, and Math-6 clu had to inves-
tigate Math-6 1585 more lines of code). For Defects4j, clu outper-
formed cln in only two cases, whereas cln outperformed clu in
50. These results (tentatively) suggest the conclusion that cln is
better to use in practice when the program and test suite resemble
the benchmarks in Defects4j, and clu when the program and test
suite resemble the benchmarks in Steimann’s benchmarks.
Finally, we think the scores of our new techniques demonstrate
they are a strong contender to sbfl heuristics when integrated into
a practical fault localisation approach.
4.3 Threats to Validity
Our threats are informed by the recent work of [23], who perform
a similar test on the Defects4j benchmarks, and by Steimann et al.,
who perform similar experiments on the Steimann benchmarks [45].
Themain threat is wrt howwell our results generalize to practical
instances of fault localisation. Given the variety of programs, faults,
test suites, and development styles in "the wild" it has not yet
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been shown whether studies of this sort generalize well. Wrt the
Steimann benchmarks, there is the additional threat that artificial
faults are not good proxies for real faults. Problems of this sort
confront many software fault localisation studies [45]. To anticipate
these problems, we have tried to improve the degree to which
our results can generalise by ensuring our experiment was large.
To our knowledge our experiment is currently the largest in the
literature in terms of three different dimensions: number of methods
compared (127+), range of faults studied (1-32), and number of
program versions used (50k+).
5 RELATEDWORK
The recent survey ofWong et al. [52] identifies the most prominent
fault localisation methods to be spectrum based [4, 13, 24, 28, 32, 36,
42, 47, 59], slice based [6, 29, 46, 53, 61], model based [33, 55, 58], and
mutation-based [34, 38]. For reasons of space, we discuss closely
related statistical approaches.
We first discuss sbh, which is one of the most lightweight meth-
ods. In general, sbh’s designed to solve the general problem of fault
localisation (for programs with any number of faults) are heuristics
which estimate how "suspicious" a given unit is. However, what
"suspicious" means is (to our knowledge) never fully defined. In
the absence of an approach which tells us this, research is driven
by the development of new measures with improved experimen-
tal performance [4, 13, 24, 28, 32, 36, 42, 47, 59]. Many of these
top-performing measures are presented in Table 1: D3 was devel-
oped by raising the numerator of a previously used measure to the
power of 3 [49]. Zoltar was developed by adding 10000nf epef to the
denominator of a previously used measure [18]. GP05 was found
using genetic programming [59]. Ochiai was originally designed
for Japanese fish classification [4, 37]. In this paper, we have tried
to improve upon the theoretical connection between developed
measures and the fault localisation problem.
We now discuss theoretical results for sbfl. Theoretical results
include proving potentially desirable formal properties of measures
and finding equivalence proofs for classes of measures [11, 28, 35,
36, 56]. Yoo et al. have established theoretical results that show that
a "best" performing suspicious measure for sbfl does not exist [60],
arguing there is "no pot of gold at the end of the program spectrum
rainbow" in theory. With this result, there remains the problem
of providing better formal foundations, and deriving improved
measures shown to satisfy more formal properties. Our work in
this paper is designed to addresses this.
Two more heavyweight approaches to multiple fault localisation
are as follows. Both of these approaches use fault models in their
analysis. Here, a fault model is a set of units with the property
that each failing trace executes at least one of them. The first is
the simple classical approach of Steimann et al. [43], where the
probability of a unit being faulty is the proportion of fault models it
is a member of. A secondmethod is Barinel [5], which uses Bayesian
analysis and heuristic policies to estimate the health of uuts, and
uses a tool Staccato [2] to generate large sets of fault models. The
main issue confronting these approaches is scalability, given the
requirement of generating large sets of fault models. Additionally,
in one study the implementation of Barinel was unable to scale to
the Steimann benchmarks [27]. We have purposely designed our
approach to avoid this issue by having a different definition of a
model which facilitates tractable fault localisation methods.
We discussmiscellaneous statistical approaches here. One type of
approach uses machine learning, including support vector machines
and neural network approaches, to perform fault localisation [7, 48].
However, these approaches do not make the case that a recourse
to machine learning methods is necessary and that a principled
approach is impossible. Other approaches include the crosstab-
based method of Wong [50], the hypothesis testing approach of
Liu [31], and the probabilistic program dependence graph approach
of Baah [8]. Landsberg et al. provide an axiomatic setup which uses
sbhs in a probabilistic framework, but does not use models [27].
We now discuss how lightweight statistical methods have been
used in the following applications. Firstly, in semi-automated fault
localisation in which users inspect code in descending order of
suspiciousness [39]. Secondly, in fully-automated fault localisation
subroutines within algorithms which inductively synthesize (such
as cegis [20]) or repair programs (such as GenProg [14]). Thirdly,
as a technique combined with other methods [9, 22, 24, 57]. Finally,
as a potential substitute for heavyweight methods which cannot
scale to large programs. Thus, there is a large field of application
for the techniques discussed in this paper.
Finally, for the approach of classical probability, the overview
of James [19], the introduction of Tijms [17], and the measure-
theoretic foundations of Kolmogorov [25] all provided bases upon
which to develop our approach.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated there is a principled formal
foundation (Doric) available for statistical fault localisation that
does not require recourse to spectrum-based heuristics. In gen-
eral, Doric opens up a world of different meaningful probabilities
which can be reported to the engineer to aid in understanding a
faulty program. To illustrate the utility of Doric, we developed two
lightweight measures of fault and causal likelihood and integrated
the latter into our fault localisation method cln . In large-scale
experimentation, cln was demonstrated to be more accurate when
compared with all known 127 sbhs . In particular, on the Steimann
benchmarks cln was almost twice as accurate as the best perform-
ing sbh— you’d expect to find a fault by examining 5.02 methods as
opposed to 9.02. cln also demonstrated to have the highest 6-score
on Defects4j. We think the combined effort demonstrates that our
measure of causal likelihood is lightweight, effective and maintains
a meaningful connection to fault localisation.
We now discuss directions for future work. First, a major step
in our work is to experiment with different weight functions (w).
There are many ways to do this, so it is our hope there will be as
much experimentation over different weights as there has been
comparing sbhs. A natural place to start is to define the relative
likelihood of a model as a function of the number of faults in that
model in conjunction with some given cumulative distribution
function. Following work on fault distributions in software [15],
we wish to weigh models with a small number of faults to have a
higher relative likelihood. The formal development in this paper
lays much of the foundations critical for this step.
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A PROOFS
In this appendix, we present the proofs supporting the main text.
To simplify, we have put a proof later in our order of presentation
if a part of that proof relies on a part of an earlier proof.
To aid in the proofs we introduce some notation. For eachmj ∈
M , mji,k is the value at the ith column and kth row. m
j
k is the
matrix consisting of the kth row of mj . For each tk ∈ T we let
Mk = {m
j
k |1 ≤ j ≤ |M |}. Intuitively, this is all different kth rows
of all models. We make use of a concatonation operation · such
that x · y is the concatonation of two matrices, and extend the
definition such thatMi ·Mj = {x ·y |x ∈ Mi ∧y ∈ Mj }. Accordingly,
definition 3 is designed to conform to the following assumption
M = M1 ·M2 · ... ·M |T | . It is observed that |Mk | = 2ρk − 1 if tk is
failing, and 1 otherwise.
Proposition A.1. Equation 9 follows using the defs.
Proof. Wemust show P(Hi∧ui ) = P(Hi ). It is sufficient to show
vk (Hi ∧ ui ) = vk (Hi ). Thus, it is sufficient to show vk (Hi ∧ ui ) =
vk (Hi ) ∩ vk (ui ) (by def. 3.4). Now, vk (Hi ) ∩ vk (ui ) ⊆ vk (Hi ) (as
in general X ∩ Y ⊆ X ), thus it remains to show vk (Hi ) ∩ vk (ui )
⊆ vk (Hi ). It is sufficient to show vk (ui ) ⊆ vk (Hi ) (as in general
X ⊆ X ). Now, vk (Hi ) = (by the abbreviation for Hi ) vk (h1 ∧ ¬h2 ∧
... ∧ ¬h |U |−1) = (by def. 3.4) vk (h1) ∩vk (¬h2) ∩ ... ∩ ¬vk (h |U |−1)
= {mj |mj1,k = 2} ∩ {mj |m
j
1,k ∈ {1, 0}} ∩ . . . (by def. 3 and 2). =
{mj |mj1,k = 2}∩ {mj |m
j
1,k ∈ {1, 0}}∩ . . . = {mj |m
j
1,k = 2∧m
j
1,k ∈
{1, 0} ∧ . . . } = {mj |mj1,k ∈ {1, 2} ∧m
j
1,k = 2∧m
j
1,k ∈ {1, 0} ∧ . . . }.
A subset of which is {mj |mj1,k ∈ {1, 2}}, which is vk (ui ) (by def. 3).
Proposition A.2. Equation 11 follows using the defs.
We sketch the proof for equation 11. Pt (Hi ) is equal to |vt (Hi ) ||M |
(by def. 3.6). We first do the top condition of equation 11. Without
loss of generality, let k = 1. Assume ci,1 = e1 = 1. Now, M = M1 ·
M2 · ... ·M |M | (by A1). Thus,v1(Hi ) = {mj1 |mj ∈ v1(Hi )} ·M2 · ... ·Mn
(as in general, v1(ϕ) = {mjk ∈ M1 |mj ∈ vk (ϕ)} · M2 · ... · Mn). So,
|v1(Hi )| = |{mj1 |mj ∈ v1(Hi )}| × |M2 | × ... × |M |T | |. So, |v1(Hi )| =
1 × |M2 | × ... × |M |T | | (given if mj ,mk ∈ v1(Hi ) then mj1 = mk1 ).
Thus, 1× |M2 | × ...× |M |T | | / |M1 | × |M2 | × ...× |M |T | |. This is equal
to 1/|M1 | (by cancellation), which is equal to 1/(2ρ1 − 1) (given
ρ1 =
∑
i< |U | ci,1). We now do the bottom condition (when either
ci,1 or e1 is 0). Accordingly, there are no models inv1(hi ) (by def. 4),
thus no models in v1(Hi ) (by def. 3.4 and Hi ), and so P1(Hi ) = 0.
Proposition A.3. Equation 12 follows using the defs.
We must show P(ui ) = ∑k ci,k/|T |. P(ui ) is equal to f (ui )/|T |
(by proposition 3.7). The latter is equal to
∑
k fk (ui )/|T |. It remains
to show fk (ui ) = ci,k , for both cases when ci,k is 1 or 0 (given c is
a Boolean matrix). Assume ci,k is 1. Then for allm ∈ M ,mi,k ∈ 1, •
(by def. 3.1). Thus, vk (ui ) = M (by def. 3.4). So, fk (ui ) = 1. Assume
ci,k is 0. Then for allm ∈ M ,mi,k = 0 (by def. 3.1). Thus,vk (ui ) = M
(by def. 3.4).
□
Proposition A.4. For all ϕ ∈ L∗, P(ϕ) = f (ϕ)|T |
Proof. We must show for all ϕ ∈ L∗, P(ϕ) = f (ϕ)|T | . P(ϕ) is equal
to
∑
k Pk (ϕ)/|T | (by def.3.6). The latter is equal to
∑
k (w(vk (ϕ))
/w(M))/|T | (by def.3.6). Now, f (ϕ)|T | =
∑
k
fk (ϕ)
|T | (by definition of f ).
Thus it is remains to provew(vk (ϕ))/w(M)) = fk (ϕ). We have two
cases to consider, when fk (ϕ) = 1 and when it is 0. We do the
former first. Assume fk (ϕ) = 1, then vk (ui ) = M (by definition
of f ). So w(vk (ϕ))/w(M)) = w(M)/w(M) = 1. Assume fk (ϕ) = 0,
then vk (ϕ) , M . If the latter, then vk (ϕ) = ∅ (as ϕ ∈ L∗). So
w(vk (ϕ))/w(M)) =w(∅)/w(M) = 0 (by def. ofw). □
Proposition A.5. Equation 3 follows given indifference
Proof. Let vk (ϕ) = {mi , . . . ,mj } and M = {m1, . . . ,M |M |}.
Then Pk (ϕ) =
∑j
i=1w({mi }) /
∑ |M |
k=1w({mk }) (by Def. 3.6). Now,
w({mk }) > 0 for allmk ∈ M (by the conditions onw and indiffer-
ence). Given indifference, let w({mk }) = x × |{mk }|. Then Pk (ϕ)
=
∑j
i=1 x |{mi }| /
∑ |M |
k=1 x |{mk }| (by substitution). Thus, Pk (ϕ) =
x
∑j
i=1 |{mi }| /x
∑ |M |
k=1 |{mk }| (by distribution). So, Pk (ϕ) =
∑j
i=1 |{mi }|
/
∑ |M |
k=1 |{mk }| (by cancellation). Equivalently, Pk (ϕ) = |{mi , . . . ,mj }|
/ |M |. So, Pk (ϕ) = |vk (ϕ)| / |M | (by substitution). □
Proposition A.6. Let c be a coverage matrix where ci,k = c j,k =
1 for some tk ∈ T . Then P(Hi |ui ) < P(Hi |ui ∧ ¬hj ).
Proof. We show P(Hi |ui ) < P(Hi |ui∧¬hj ) given the conditions
of the proposition. This is equivalent to P(Hi ∧ui )/P(ui ) < P(Hi ∧
ui ∧¬hj )/ P(ui ∧¬hj ) (by |-def.). Equivalently, P(Hi ∧ui )/P(ui ) <
P(Hi ∧ ui )/ P(ui ∧ ¬hj ) (given Hi implies ¬hj ). Accordingly, it is
sufficient to show 1/P(ui ) < 1/P(ui ∧¬hj ). It then suffices to show
P(ui ) > P(ui ∧ ¬hj ). Equivalently, ∑k Pk (ui )/|T | > ∑k Pk (ui ∧
¬hj )/|T | (by def. 3.6). Equivalently, ∑k Pk (ui ) > ∑k Pk (ui ∧ ¬hj )
(by cancellation). Equivalently,
∑
k |vk (ui )|/|M | >
∑
k |vk (ui ∧
¬hj )|/|M |. Equivalently, ∑k |vk (ui )| > ∑k |vk (ui ∧ ¬hj )| (by can-
cellation). Equivalently,
∑
k |vk (ui )| >
∑
k |vk (ui ) ∩ (M −v(hj )))|
(by def. 3.3). It is sufficient to showM −v(hj ) ⊂ vk (ui ).vk (ui ) = M
(given ci,k = 1). Thus it suffices to showM −v(hj ) ⊂ M . To prove
this, it is sufficient to show v(hj ) , ∅. This holds given c j,k = 1
(given the conditions of the proposition and def. 3.1). □
Proposition A.7. Equations 4, 5, & 6 follow given indifference.
Proof. We sketch the proof here. Equation 4 follows given the
definition of fi in Section 3. Equation 6 is similar to the proof for
Equation 11. We do the proof for Equation 5 here. As the general
proof for this involves syntactically complex formulae, we sketch
the proof for reasons of space, and do the case for when there are
two test cases T = {t1, t2} here. P(^1hi ∨ ^2hi ) = (1 − P(^1hi ))
(P(^1hi ))+ P(^2hi )). The latter expression is equal to (P(^1hi ))+
P(^2hi )) - (P(^1hi )P(^1hi )). Thus it is sufficient to prove P(^1hi∨
^2hi ) is equal to that. Now, in general P(ϕ∨ψ ) = P(ϕ)+P(ψ )−P(ϕ∧
ψ ). Thus it suffices to show P(^1hi )P(^1hi ) = P(^1hi ∧^1hi ). It is
sufficient to show |v1(hi )∩v2(hi )|/|M | = |v1(hi )|/|M |×|v2(hi )|/|M |.
It is sufficient to show |v1(hi ) ∩ v2(hi )| = |v1(hi )| |v2(hi )|. Now
M = M1 ·M2. Thus, for everymj1 ∈ M1 there is a pairedm
j
2 ∈ M2.
Thus |v1(hi ) ∩v2(hi )| = |v1(hi )| |v2(hi )|. □
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